[PATCH v2] Enable Travis-CI as a backup continuous integration service.

David Edmondson dme at dme.org
Fri May 16 04:11:52 PDT 2014


On Thu, May 15 2014, Wael Nasreddine wrote:
> It is fragile, but unfortunately there's no way (As far as I know)
> around this problem. Travis-CI is currently running Ubuntu Precise
> (12.04) and they have plans to update to Trusty[0] but it's going to take
> them some time.

Please forgive my ignorance. What is the place from which you are
grabbing these packages? It doesn't seem to be part of the Ubuntu
repositories. Is there no backports or security-updates repository for
Ubuntu 12.04?

I'm really asking whether there is a way to use the standard Ubuntu
repositories to get the packages rather than downloading them directly.

>> - What happens when those are no longer the right version numbers?
> I can host the files in a Github repository if that would work better? I
> am not very concerned about security in this case because Travis runs in
> an isolated disposable VM created for the build and destroyed
> afterwards.

I have no strong preference. If they aren't coming from the standard
repositories then it's all just slightly different versions of bad :-)

>> - What happens when those versions are already provided by the standard
>>   repository?
>
> When #2046[0] is fixed by the Travis-CI team, our travis.yml will be
> updated to work accordingly.

Presume that you have lost interest in notmuch. How will we know that
this has happened?

>> - What happens if travis runs start happening on (say) an arm64 machine?
>
> Travis is currently running amd64[1] and I don't think they have plans
> to change that, in fact I heard that they have plans to support more
> architectures configurable in .travis.yml

Your two statements seem contradictory here.

>> I realise that you might answer "I will keep this up to date", but we
>> have to worry about what happens if you lose interest and wander away.
>
> Absolutely, I understand your point and no one can guarantee
> maintainer-ship. I can modify my patch and add documentation (comments
> in the yaml file) about what each flag does, where can you documentation
> about it and of course details about the hack. Would that be helpful?

Comments explaining the need to grab the packages directly would be the
absolute minimum requirement, I think. Include a pointer to the travis
issue that you mentioned.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 310 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://notmuchmail.org/pipermail/notmuch/attachments/20140516/e9c1f08e/attachment.pgp>


More information about the notmuch mailing list